One of the greater mysteries of Arab Palestinian grievance is what its adherents hope to achieve by continuously peddling their almost absurdly asymmetrical narrative.
Do they imagine, for example, that their relentless demonisation of the Jewish state will reach some sort of tipping point that it will suddenly go 'poof' and vanish forever with no further unpleasant consequences for the region?
All the fundamental problems with the standard Arab Palestinian tale for global consumption were on display in Columbia agitator and former-detainee Mahmoud Khalil's recent interview with New York Times columnist Ezra Klein.
Khalil talks about the lack of legal rights enjoyed by Palestinians Arabs in Syria today and how his grandma's family were forced to depart a township called Tiveria, now situated within Israel.
But he does not expand at all on the underlying circumstances. Indeed, he very specifically fails to mention the bloodthirsty pogrom carried out against the Jewish population of that same town in 1938, which you'd think might have played some role in his family's ultimate departure from it.
Like a lot of those who identify as Palestinian Arabs, he focuses exclusively on his own sense of loss, but at no point recognises any of the following:
- That the original UN partition plan envisaged no major displacement of populations in situ.
- That many of the Arabs who were eventually forced to move because of the war they had started were shifted out of the way not by Israelis, but in reality by other Arabs.
- That many of those who ended up as hereditary refugees after the '48 war were not even long-term Palestinians proper, but trapped migrants that the other Arab states wished to use as political pawns.
And most crucially, when we consider the strange yet relevant symmetries of grievance, that more Jews were displaced from around the Middle East as a result of this conflict they did not choose, than Arabs after the so called 'Nakba'.
Khalil describes the October 7 atrocity to Klein as a 'desperate attempt to break the cycle', when what it surely more obviously represented was a desperate attempt by Hamas and its Iranian sponsors to head off the imminent threat of diplomatic normalisation: in other words, to continue the cycle at all costs.
For peace to now have a chance, everyone in the region needs to able to anticipate an existence with a significant measure of security from ethno-religious aggression, having put away the various custom-made historical axes that they have been attempting to grind for over a century.
And the various other big players, inside and outside the region, really need to stop making use of this conflict as a tool for the expression and even management of their own domestic social and political issues. (This is by no means limited to Arab nations any more.)
It might seem 'fair' to compensate for the seemingly monstrous asymmetry in military might with a fabricated and also quite monstrous asymmetry in how the past is chronicled, pro-actively remembered and then disseminated, but this attempt at rebalancing has only served to add spin to the cycle and undermines the cause of peace overall.
This means that right now, Palestinian Arabs in particular, ought to let go of their own exclusive, 'cosmic' sense of loss in how this has all played out.
The long history of Islamic colonialism and oppression in this area cannot be made to simply vanish from the record by convincing a load of unlettered, radicalised-lite Americans that everybody else is the coloniser, the occupier, the would be genocidal maniac...never the poor, misunderstood Islamist.
On some level every single Palestinian Arab in the Levant is descended from a conqueror — rather like white South Africans — and whatever their inferred rights may now be, they surely also have a certain obligation to play a tempered role in discovering a post-colonial solution which ultimately works for all the regional communities, especially those who were there before the Mohammedans came charging in.
And beyond a subset of gullible nitwits, nobody is really buying their inverted narrative of occupation and loss, which is rather plainly geared towards a form of exclusively Jihadist RE-colonisation.
Right now what is happening is terrible. It will end, as the last World War ended, when the bad guys are defeated and their system fully dismantled. Their bomb-blasted territory will almost certainly then be occupied by the victors, while a plan for the post-fascist, de-militarised future is then mooted, and, one supposes, funded.
This is how these things nearly always go, certainly that's how it went for the Germans and the Japanese.
All discourse which aims to delay, distract, even deny this outcome, no matter how well it apes the language of humanitarian concern or righteous anger, strikes me as fundamentally immoral, because it will only function to extend the evolving calamity, and then 'the cycle'.