The Place of Soldiers

On paper at least, the rationale for the invasion occupation of Afghanistan seemed fairly simple back in 2001. These days it is more likely to appeal to those that prefer their situations to be riddled with sobering contradictions, if not completely intractable.

I am following with great interest Elizabeth Rubin's account of her experiences In the land of the Taliban in which she attempts to uncover the reasons for the recent resurgence of the men in white turbans.

From 1994-2001 the Taliban were an entrenched and isolated medieval regime. In Rubin's words "a cloistered clique". Thanks in part to the Internet − not always a progressive force − this once inward looking rebellion has become part of what may yet become a global insurgency of the Muslim umma. (It's worth recalling here that the genocidal activities of Guatemala's military governments in the 80s ultimately served only to foster something which had not really existed before outside the pages of the National Geographic, a unified Maya identity. )

There are still a great many different interests in play here, many different local counter-narratives that fit to a greater or lesser extent the outside world's understanding of what is at stake. No wonder NATO troops are starting to ponder the identity of their elusive enemy. 'Terrorist' will hardly make much sense to anyone on the ground.

And amongst the jihadis themselves there are several different notions of what the holy war should mean. For some it is a war of liberation, for others a war of self-improvement. Only a minority perhaps have a geopolitical view. For many Afghans lodged in between the warring forces, allegiance is necessarily allocated on a pragmatic basis.

The Taliban too have become more pragmatic. Pre-2001 they suppressed the cultivation of opium poppies. Now they are encouraging it, and reaping the financial benefits.

As nation-builders the Americans are literally cowboys. Unwilling to fill the power vacuum they have allowed the warlords to rally, and to shore up their reestablished power, some of these strongmen have tended to label anyone in their way Al Qaeda, in the hope of drawing in an airstrike from the obliging Kaffirs.

Meanwhile Pakistan's heart feels one thing while its tongue says another. There are many reasons for this. Their bitter rivalry with India, one of Karzai's main supporters along with America, their territorial ambitions, Musharraf's need to appease his country's own religious factions and the suspicion that the Americans have used them "like condoms". As in Guatemala retired army Generals represent a semi-secret power structure that the executive branch can control only loosely.

And then there's Gitmo, lately excused by Olly North in the following manner:

"Of the 247 detainees who have been released thus far, 25 -- more than ten percent -- are believed to have returned to the "jihad." One of them, Abdullah Mehsud, spent two years in Guantanamo after being captured fighting with the Taliban. He was released after convincing U.S. interrogators that he was an innocent Afghan tribesman. Last October, after returning to Pakistan, his "country of choice," he kidnapped two Chinese engineers. He claims that he and his followers will "fight America and its allies until the very end."

"Mullah Shahzada spent two years at a special "seaside house" with fellow teenage detainees. There he was taught English, played sports, and watched videos designed to make him "like us." After swearing an oath against violence he was returned to Afghanistan. Just weeks later he became one of twelve former detainees confirmed killed by coalition forces while fighting with Taliban al Qaeda units. "

I wonder where you can get hold of those become like us videos!